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1.
Introduction
Even though they are remarkably diverse behaviorally, cognitively, and evolutionarily,
invertebrate animals are often lumped into a single category and excluded from welfarebased consideration. Where invertebrates are given ethical consideration in the regulation of
research and in common morality, it is largely limited to considerations of conservation,
where their value is assessed instrumentally in terms of the ecological services they provide
within broader communities and ecosystems (Eisenhauer et al. 2019; Sánchez-Bayo &
Wyckhuys 2019). Although the ecological approach to moral value makes sense for insentient
animals (such as corals), it is inadequate for invertebrates with brains that could support rich
forms of cognition and sentience, and thus a psychological welfare of their own. Major
scientific funding agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), request
information about proposed use only concerning vertebrate animals, explicitly encouraging
scientists to replace vertebrates with invertebrates to promote ethically sounder research
(Wilson-Sanders 2011, p. 127). Recently, some regulatory bodies in the European Union and
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees in the United States have created an exception
for cephalopod molluscs (coleoids [octopuses/squid/cuttlefish] + nautiloids), which have
attained the status of ‘honorary vertebrates’ as their cognitive capacities have drawn
widespread recognition (Directive 2010/63/EU 2010; Low et al. 2012). U.S. federal agencies,
however, such as the USDA, continue to classify cephalopods along with all other
invertebrates as mere ‘dissected tissue’ (Carere & Mather 2019).
Although these protections for coleoid cephalopod molluscs are encouraging, other
invertebrate lineages with centralized nervous systems and flexible behaviors, such as
arthropods (insects/crustaceans + arachnids + myriapods), continue to receive little to no
welfare consideration even though they have been the subject of a systematic and wideranging empirical investigation indicating that they have mental capacities that could give
rise to morally protectable interests. Prompted by Elwood’s (2011; see also Harvey-Clark
2011) research and lobbying, the EU did recently consider (though it ultimately rejected)
granting protections to decapod crustaceans. We are aware of no such proposals for other
arthropod groups, such as insects and spiders, which comprise the vast majority of
arthropods found in nature and used in laboratories.
Much of the prevailing ethical thought on invertebrates took hold during a time when
little was known about the cognitive capacities, neurological complexities, and flexible
behaviors of certain invertebrate species. Over the last several decades, however, a growing
body of research is pointing to sophisticated cognitive abilities in a number of invertebrate
lineages. There is growing evidence that some molluscs and arthropods have the capacity for
subjective experience (i.e., sentience: Klein & Barron 2016; Mather 2019a; Godfrey-Smith
2017). Nevertheless, with rare exceptions, such as the recent attention afforded to octopuses
(Godfrey-Smith 2016), philosophers and policymakers have continued to operate on the
basis of outdated information about invertebrate cognition and behavior. Philosophers who
have engaged with invertebrate cognition and consciousness (e.g., Schwitzgebel 2018; Klein
& Barron 2016; Feinberg & Mallatt 2016/2018; Tye 2016) have typically demurred on the
ethical implications of these findings. (One exception is Carruthers (2007), whose view is
discussed in §3.3, has taken a stance but a negative one.) Philosophical discussions of animal
welfare, meanwhile, have focused on mammals and birds, extending only recently to basal
vertebrates like fishes (see the commentary on Woodruff 2017). Although pioneering work
on invertebrate welfare is found in scientific forums (see ILAR 2011; Carere & Mather 2019),
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it has interacted little with philosophical ethics and has been met with resistance in public
policy — although there are signs this landscape is beginning to change (Rethink Priorities
2019).
In this target article, we argue that the exclusion of certain invertebrates from
bioethics and science policy is not warranted given the state of the evidence and plausible
conceptions of moral standing. We attribute the exclusion of arthropods in general, and
terrestrial arthropods in particular, to the following four factors:
(i) a lingering progressivist reading of evolution according to which invertebrates are lower in the
scala naturae;
(ii) the a priori assumption that small brains are unlikely to support sophisticated cognition or
sentience (which is contrary to the existing body of behavioral and neuroscientific evidence,
principles of evolutionary continuity, and the potential for convergence on psychological
functions);
(iii) human cognitive-affective biases that distort moral judgments and mental state attributions
concerning unfamiliar, disgust-provoking beings;
(iv) an inappropriate balancing of scientific uncertainty and moral risk.

Although some or all of these problems are likely to shape moral attitudes and policy toward
basal vertebrate lineages (such as fish and lizards), they are particularly acute in the
arthropod context. Similarly, while uncertainties about the presence of sophisticated forms
of cognition and sentience pervade all of comparative cognitive science, they are most
pronounced in research on the minds of invertebrates, whose brains, behaviors, and life
histories share few ancestral similarities with those of vertebrates. Appreciating the diverse
forms of sentience found throughout the animal kingdom may not only lead to a more
inclusive animal ethics, but it may also shed light on foundational moral concepts themselves.
Making progress on these issues, however, requires that we engage with the formidable
conceptual and methodological challenges that confront the scientific and moral study of
‘alien’ minds on Earth.
2.
Challenging the Invertebrate Dogma
To understand the differential ethical treatment that has been accorded to vertebrates and
invertebrates, it is useful to begin with the problematic nature of the distinction itself. The
category ‘invertebrate’ does not represent a proper clade, since the groups included under
this umbrella do not share a single common ancestor that is not also shared with vertebrates.
Moreover, the vertebrate-invertebrate distinction lumps the immense diversity of
invertebrate life into a single undifferentiated category, doing more to obscure morally
relevant cognitive diversity among animals than to illuminate it. Worse still, the vertebrateinvertebrate dichotomy is a value-laden one, with invertebrates taken, either explicitly or
implicitly, to occupy a lower rung in the scala naturae. Pre-Darwinian evolutionary
iconography, such as Ernst Haeckel’s Pedigree of Man, depicts the history of life as an ‘ascent’
from monad to man with invertebrates occupying the second-lowest tier, just above protozoa
but below non-mammalian vertebrates.
Whereas biology has long since jettisoned progressivist readings of evolutionary
history, bioethics and policy remain very much encumbered by them. For instance, The NIH
asks researchers who are proposing to use vertebrates in an experiment to explain why ‘less
highly evolved’ animal models, such as invertebrates, could not be used instead. We are not
3
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suggesting that this anachronistic evolutionary baggage fully explains the moral exclusion of
invertebrates. Nor does it show that this treatment of invertebrates is indefensible in
principle. However, in raising suspicions about the validity of attitudes and institutionalized
practices toward invertebrates, it provides a launching point for a fuller explanation and
evaluation.
The most plausible justification for the moral exclusion of invertebrates is that they
lack the psychological properties that give rise to ‘moral standing,’ or the intrinsic value that
places constraints on how a being may be treated. There is no consensus about the minimum
psychological conditions necessary for a life that matters for its own sake (Buchanan 2009).
Nor is there agreement about the psychological conditions above this minimum that give rise
to higher moral statuses or, if one prefers, to weightier moral interests. There is, however,
broad philosophical consensus that to have a welfare is to have a life that can go well or poorly
for the subject of experience. What makes a life go well or poorly can be glossed in different
ways, such as in terms of pleasure and pain, the fulfillment of desires, the pursuit of valuable
personal projects, an ‘objective’ list of circumstances that would make one’s life go well
irrespective of one’s actual desires, and so forth (Crisp 2017). At the center of all of these
views, however, is an experiencing subject of a life that matters in its own right. If
invertebrates do not have welfares, then they have no interests, preferences, or desires to
take into account and hence they may be exploited as mere instruments to the ends of others.
For these reasons, we operate on the assumption that welfare is a psychological property and
that some form of mental life is a precondition for morally protectable interests. Some more
expansive theories of moral standing would include entities whose insentience is
uncontroversial, such as bacteria, forests, and rivers, but we will not address those views here
(see Basl 2019 for a critical discussion).
We will refer to the notion that invertebrates are not loci of welfare — and hence that
they may be excluded from ethical consideration in research, husbandry, agriculture, and
human activities more broadly — as the ‘invertebrate dogma.’ In what follows, we will argue
that the current state of comparative research on brains, behavior, consciousness, and
emotion suggests that even small-brained invertebrates are likely to have welfares and hence
moral standing. Many of the same experimental paradigms that have been used to establish
the existence of sophisticated cognition and sentience in vertebrates have also been used —
and their findings replicated — in research on invertebrate cognition. The case we will make,
therefore, is one of consistency: the same empirical and philosophical basis for extending
protections to all vertebrates calls for extending similar protections to some invertebrate
clades.
2.1 Brains. One reason invertebrates with complex brains and behavior may be thought to
lack the cognitive and affective properties that comprise a welfare is the high prior
probability some assign to the notion that very small brains cannot (or are highly unlikely to)
generate mental states. The idea is that there are minimum neuro-computational thresholds
for mind that are not met by invertebrates. This is not a concern in the case of some coleoid
molluscs, such as octopuses, whose neural densities and structural complexities rival those
of mammals (even taking into account the distributed nature of coleoid nervous systems).
However, the same cannot be said for other, small-brained invertebrates, such as arthropods,
who comprise a large fraction of invertebrates used in research. The assumption that small
brains are unlikely to support sentient life is problematic, however, for several reasons.
4
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First, the neuro-computational thresholds needed to generate minimum mental
capacities are unknown and cannot be determined from the armchair. Neural network
analysis is helpful insofar as it allows us to experiment with minimal wiring solutions for
specific cognitive functions, but these are highly idealized; independent evidence is needed
to establish that the options selected by the model would have been available to natural
selection. It is critical, therefore, that we investigate what small centralized nervous systems
can actually do in the world. Just as important, we need to work out how they do these things
(see Budaev et al. 2019 for further discussion). Behavioral data from carefully controlled
experiments are indispensable for both these projects. Until we have a fully worked out and
empirically corroborated theory of the relationships among neural tissue, cognitive
processes, and phenomenology, we are not in a position to rule out or even deem unlikely the
possibility that tiny brains can give rise to sentient lives with interests that merit moral
protection.
Second, relative brain size is a better indicator of cognitive sophistication than
absolute brain size, since (ceteris paribus) it indicates that there has been differential
evolutionary investment in metabolically costly brain tissue that pays for itself through the
cognitive functions that additional neuro-processing power provides. However, even relative
brain-size analysis is too coarse-grained (Healy & Rowe 2006), especially across distantly
related taxa (Logan et al. 2018), to allow for any definitive judgments about cognitive
potential. More fine-grained features, such as total neuron number, neuron density,
connectivity, metabolic rate, and modularity are better indicators of the cognitive capacities
of brains (Chittka & Niven 2009; Chitkka & Farris 2012). Most of these features, however, do
not scale linearly with size. A higher neuron number, for instance, might be achieved by
increasing not brain volume but neuron density, and by shrinking the size of neurons
(Olkowicz et al. 2016).1 Although arthropods have smaller neuron totals than coleoids and
vertebrates, neural network models suggest that some forms of cognition may be
computationally inexpensive and can be accomplished with small numbers of neurons
(Logan et al. 2018). As with computers, bigger is not necessarily better. There is no reason to
think that there are high minimum size thresholds for the presence of the kinds of mental
states that factor into sentience.
More important than total computing power is how information is integrated in the
brain and embodied in the organism, as inferred from the structure of brains and behavior.
The brains of many insects, spiders, and coleoid molluscs have structural characteristics that
could support sophisticated forms of cognition. In particular, they have central processing
regions (the ‘mushroom bodies’ and central complex in arthropods and the vertical lobes in
coleoids) that continuously receive, integrate, and exchange information with peripheral
systems via ‘reentrant pathways’ (Giurfa 2013; Edelman & Gally 2013), permitting
centralized coordination of multi-modal sensory information and executive (top-down)
Smaller brain size may actually confer advantages. For example, smaller brains tend to have shorter interneuronal distances; these shrink the distance that information has to travel and thus conduction delays.
Arthropods also have multi-functional neurons that economize on available space and energy while
preserving a range of functionalities. At the same time, miniaturization may force tradeoffs, such as between
modularity (needed for functional specialization) and redundancy (needed for parallel processing).
Miniaturization also imposes costs: for example, it restricts total neuron number and limits available energy
by reducing space for mitochondria. (For comprehensive reviews, see Chittka & Niven 2009 and Niven &
Farris 2012.)
1
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control. The cognitive signatures of centralized information processing are reflected in the
behavioral complexity of these animals, as we shall now see.
2.2 Behavior and cognition. Although some researchers were initially skeptical that flexible
behaviors could be generated by tiny arthropod brains, the combined weight of the
neuroscientific and behavioral evidence suggests that complex cognition may be much more
broadly distributed in the tree of animal life than previously thought. It is now well known
that coleoid molluscs (octopus, squid, and cuttlefish), who have large, hierarchically
structured brains, have excellent spatial navigation and communication abilities, excel at
problem-solving, and may even use rudimentary tools (Mather 2019a; Finn et al. 2009). Less
widely appreciated is the substantial accumulation of experimental evidence, thanks in large
part to the pioneering work of Lars Chittka and his collaborators, that some arthropods are
capable of sophisticated cognitive feats that indicate the presence of a richer mental life than
traditionally thought, one that may give rise to a welfare.
For example, among the insects, there is evidence that honeybees can learn abstract
concepts (Chittka 2017; Howard et al. 2017) including same/different, larger/smaller, and
above/below. They can also transfer these concepts across sensory modalities (e.g., from
vision to olfaction). Honeybees can be taught addition and subtraction procedures (Howard
et al. 2018/2019), appear to have the concept of ‘zero’ (Nieder 2018), and can learn to attend
to global or local features of objects (Dyer et al. 2016). Bumblebees can not only learn
complex and highly non-instinctive tasks, such as rolling a tiny ball (Loukola et al. 2017) or
pulling a string to reel in a reward: they can transmit this information culturally (Alem et al.
2016). They can also recognize objects and patterns through one modality (e.g., touch,
olfaction) that they previously encountered only in another modality (e.g., vision) (Solvi et al.
2020; Lawson et al. 2018). Bees and wasps can recognize human faces, although only wasps
do so without prior training (Dyer et al. 2005; Chittka 2017). One study suggests that ants
can pass the mirror self-recognition test (Cammaerts 2015), which human infants only pass
at around 20 months of age. There is even tantalizing evidence of causal reasoning and
means-end rationality in bees (Loukola et al. 2017) and transitive inference in paper wasps
(Tibbetts et al. 2019).
Bees are excellent models for the study of invertebrate cognition because they are
highly trainable, responsive to rewards, and neurologically complex. For these reasons, while
bees may be model insects, they are not necessarily the best model for other insects. The
extent to which findings in bees (or hymenopterans more broadly) generalize to other
arthropods is unclear. However, flexible learning mechanisms and the neural correlates of
attention have also been shown in flies, cockroaches, and other insect orders (for a review,
see Greenspan & Swinderen 2004). Among arachnids, jumping spiders (salticids) have been
shown to plan routes that include elaborate detours, deploy sophisticated ambush strategies,
and switch flexibly among hunting techniques in order to overcome the defenses of
unfamiliar prey types (Harland & Jackson 2000). Salticids have also demonstrated
numerosity abilities at the level of human infants (Cross & Jackson 2017); many insects seem
to have such capacities (Skorupski et al. 2018; Giurfa 2019). These findings are consistent
with ‘thinking’ broadly construed and, taken in conjunction with comparative brain data, call
the invertebrate dogma into question.
Many of the arthropod cognition studies are modelled on studies of vertebrate
cognition, which were adapted from paradigms in human developmental psychology.
6
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Although performance is not always comparable across invertebrate and vertebrate animals
(see Abramson & Wells 2018 for examples and discussion), experiments that do show
parallel results are instructive: Bees have been taught to distinguish between human painting
styles (such as impressionism and cubism) using techniques and controls that were used to
demonstrate the same ability in pigeons (Wu et al. 2013). Bees and wasps can learn to
recognize faces and patterns holistically (Avarguès-Weber et al. 2010), with performance
that approximates that of vertebrates trained to make the same sorts of discriminations
(Marzluff et al. 2010). Bees were found to respond to ambiguous stimuli with decreased
confidence and to opt out of difficult choices (Perry & Barron 2013) using the same
uncertainty-monitoring paradigm that has been used to probe for this aspect of
metacognition in a wide variety of vertebrates, from rats to dolphins (Foote & Crystal 2007;
Smith & Washburn 2005). Tests of numerosity in jumping spiders use the same ‘looking time’
paradigm — measuring surprise and expectation — that is used to probe for belief-states in
vertebrates including pre-linguistic humans. Honeybees were found to discriminate
quantities containing up to six items on a delayed match-to-sample task (Gross et al. 2009),
the same task that has been used productively with vertebrates such as dolphins and rhesus
macaques (Killian et al. 2003; Brannon et al. 2000). Studies of affect in bees and flies use the
same ‘cognitive bias’ paradigm as in studies of emotion in vertebrates (Mendl et al. 2009;
more on this in §2.3).
The same behavior can have multiple cognitive realizations, so these findings might
reflect evolutionary convergence on behavioral flexibility without convergence on the
underlying cognitive mechanisms that produce that flexibility. Deflationary (simpler)
cognitive explanations of impressive arthropod performance cannot be decisively ruled out.
(On association-based explanations of abstract concept learning in insects, see Vasas &
Chittka 2019; Cope et al. 2018.) However, and this is key, neither can deflationary cognitive
explanations of vertebrate performance be ruled out, even in the case of very young human
children. Moreover, complex cognitive explanations of invertebrate behavior may turn out to
be less burdensome computationally and more parsimonious — and in these respects
‘simpler’ (see §4.1) — evolutionarily than their deflationary counterparts (Perry & Chittka
2019). Thus, in the absence of other assumptions that have yet to be articulated, the
behavioral evidence does not justify the asymmetrical ethical treatment of vertebrates and
invertebrates.
That said, it is not clear that the cognitive capacities probed in the above experiments
are necessary conditions for moral standing, since creatures may be sentient even if they lack,
say, numerosity, transitive inference, or problem-solving. Nor are these cognitive abilities
clearly sufficient for moral standing: a system may be capable of sophisticated cognitive feats
but lack the feeling that would ordinarily accompany them, as may be true of some AI and
insentient robots. Nevertheless, these findings do point to the ability to classify the world into
meaningful categories, to forge new associations among them, and to make these available
for adaptive action. Such flexible learning abilities are probably underwritten, at least in
naturally evolved organisms, by valenced states of pleasure and pain that motivate learned
discriminations and configure sentient experience.
2.3 Sentience. The traditional idea that arthropods are incapable of flexible learning and do
not form sophisticated representations of their world has been refuted by the body of
research on invertebrate cognition summarized above. Nevertheless, one could try to salvage
7
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the invertebrate dogma by arguing that even if small-brained invertebrates like arthropods
are surprisingly sophisticated cognitively, they lack the felt experience and emotional
capacities that make them matter morally.
2.3.1. Subjective experience. If a creature is incapable of experience — if there is nothing it
feels like from the inside to be that creature (Nagel 1974) — then it cannot be a locus of
pleasurable and aversive states, it has no interests that can be set back, and hence it can be
neither harmed nor benefitted. In other words, there is no meaningful notion of psychological
welfare for that system. Phenomenal consciousness is thus a precondition for moral standing
(Kahane & Savulescu 2009).
Phenomenal consciousness was traditionally linked to human-like cortical structures,
and hence it was widely assumed that animals who lack these structures (e.g., fishes, birds,
and all invertebrates) are unlikely to be subjects of experience (Key 2016; Rose 2002).
However, there are several clear limitations of this homology-based approach. First and most
obviously, it overlooks the possibility that there has been evolutionary convergence on the
neurofunctional organizations that give rise to experiencing subjects (Dinets 2016; Elwood
2016; Güntürkün 2012, Güntürkün & Bugnyar 2016; Low et al. 2012). Second, many cortical
functions in humans were co-opted from more ancient brain structures that predated the
evolution of the cortex. Third, the cortex-centric approach does not explain why vertebrates
that lack the six-layered cortex found in mammals (such as birds, lizards, and fish) are
commonly included in the research ethics calculus, whereas invertebrates are systematically
excluded.
Furthermore, complex functional traits (sensory, locomotive, computational,
metabolic, etc.) can not only be realized by disparate anatomical, developmental, and
biomolecular bases — they are also generally continuous rather than discrete. Thus, one
might expect phenomenal consciousness to be continuously distributed in the animal world
with no clear cut-off between experiencers and those that are incapable of experience. The
key unanswered question, of course, is what the lowest bounds of this spectrum might look
like. On the other hand, some theorists (e.g., Carruthers 2019) contend that phenomenal
consciousness is a discrete rather than continuous property: the lights are either on or off;
there is no ‘dimmer switch.’ But even if the capacity for experience does not admit of degrees,
this, too, leaves the minimal experience problem unresolved: how we identify the simplest or
most primitive character states that give rise to conscious experience.
It has also been shown, however, that many cognitive and perceptual functions are
carried out unconsciously in humans (for a review, see Boly et al. 2013). This decoupling has
led some ethologists (Cartmill 2017) and philosophers (Allen-Hermanson 2008) to suggest
that arthropods may be the closest that evolution has come to producing real-life examples
of ‘philosophical zombies’ (Chalmers 1996) — logically conceivable creatures whose
behavior is indistinguishable from that of conscious beings but for whom all is ‘dark on the
inside.’ This case is strengthened by robots that replicate the behavior of nonhuman animals
without, presumably, reproducing the experiential qualities that are normally thought to
attend those behaviors. However, there is a large gap between the idea that some cognitive
operations and behaviors are carried out unconsciously in humans or human artifacts and
the notion that active, intentional, behaviorally flexible, and yet wholly non-conscious
cognitive creatures actually exist in the world.
8
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Alternatively, one might accept that some invertebrates are phenomenally conscious
but deny they are moral patients on the grounds that they do not exceed the ‘richness’
threshold for the content of subjective experience that is necessary for moral standing (see,
e.g., Frey 1983). No one has yet demonstrated precisely what such a threshold would look
like, however, nor on what philosophical grounds it would be justified. Moreover, if
arthropod behavioral experiments probe the cognitive content of conscious experience, then
there is evidence for cognitively ‘rich’ experience in arthropods of the sort often used to
justify extending protections to vertebrate animals in research and agricultural contexts.2
2.3.2. Feeling. Phenomenal consciousness alone is not an adequate basis by which to
establish the existence of a welfare. It is empirically inadequate because the concept of
phenomenal consciousness is hotly contested and, on some definitions, impossible to
measure. It is conceptually inadequate because, in addition to having experiences, a being
must also care about what happens to it in some basic sense. And if things are to matter to an
organism, it must be capable of experiencing states of affairs as pleasurable or aversive, even
if it does not explicitly recognize them as such. We think this affective glossing of conscious
experience is better captured by the term sentience.3
Unlike phenomenal consciousness, whose causal powers and evolutionary functions
are unclear, affectively valenced states play a clearer role in adaptive behavior. The
motivational force of emotions comes from the embodied feelings that attend a given
appraisal (James 1890). Without the ability to attach feelings to actions and objects, animals
(at least as they are constituted on Earth) would be incapable of complex action, decisionmaking, and learning (Damasio 1994). Some arthropods appear capable not only of
perceiving objects as ‘bound’ wholes rather than non-integrated collections of local features,
but capable also of classifying objects into appropriately valenced categories like ‘predator,’
‘prey,’ ‘mate,’ ‘foraging item,’ ‘obstacle,’ etc., which in turn support sophisticated feats of
learning, navigation, foraging, and cooperation.
The scientific study of affect among invertebrates is still fairly new, but evidence
suggests that insects have convergently evolved ‘emotion-like’ states or embodied action
tendencies that in some cases are mediated by the same neurotransmitters that modulate
emotion in humans (Perry et al. 2016; Burke et al. 2012: see Baracchi et al. 2017 for careful
review). For example, bumblebees tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli more optimistically
after exposure to a pleasant stimulus, just as humans tend to do when they are happy or calm.
Conversely, vigorously shaking bees appears to induce a pessimistic bias in odor
discrimination tests. In these experiments, bees are first trained to associate one odor with a
There is an ongoing philosophical debate over how to think about the relation between cognitive
sophistication and moral considerability. Some understand moral considerability in terms of differences in
moral statuses that are achieved when a certain threshold of mental capacity is met (such as sentience or
rationality); others would describe moral considerability in terms of a single threshold for sentience beyond
which there is a continuum of interests that are factors in different moral obligations (for discussions, see
DeGrazia 2008; McMahan 2009). Our argument is compatible with both of these approaches.
2

Whether the presence of affect is an indicator of phenomenal consciousness depends on the theories of affect
and consciousness that one chooses to adopt; it also depends on whether one conceives of valence in
representational terms or rather as an intrinsic quality of evaluative experience (Carruthers 2018). If valence
is an intrinsic quality of experience, then all phenomenally-conscious states are sentient states and all
phenomenally-conscious creatures are sentient creatures.
3
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sucrose reward and another with quinine punishment, and then they are presented with
samples containing different ratios of each odor (Bateson et al. 2011). While Bateson et al.
interpreted their results as indicating that bees have emotion-like states, Giurfa (2013)
advanced an alternative deflationary explanation, which was subsequently cited favorably in
a major review of pain in animals (Sneddon et al. 2014). According to Giurfa’s interpretation,
the shaking may have triggered improved discrimination rather than inducing displeasure.
However, if shaking had improved judgment, then shaken bees’ performance should have
improved for all discriminations, including ambiguous odors toward the sucrose-rich
(pleasant) end of the spectrum. Instead, Bateson’s results show a steady decline in the shaken
bees’ willingness to sample any of the options, exactly as the pessimism hypothesis predicts.
2.3.3. Pain. Of all affectively valenced feelings, pain is perhaps most at the center of moral
questions surrounding the treatment of nonhuman animals. The evidence for vertebrate-like
pain in invertebrates is mixed and inconclusive. Many invertebrates have nociceptors, or
specialized neural receptors that detect tissue damage. These specialized cells predate the
split of bilaterally symmetric animals into deuterostomes (vertebrates and echinoderms) and
protostomes (all other bilaterian invertebrates), and are hence present in bilaterians without
centralized nervous systems (Smith & Lewin 2009). If we presume that pain perception
requires a brain, then nociception is not sufficient for pain perception (Allen et al. 2005).
While there is agreement that pain perception occurs downstream of nociceptor input
(Tracey 2017), the nature of that downstream processing remains poorly understood.
Markers of traditional pain perception include the presence of endogenous opioids,
responsiveness to anaesthetics and analgesics, grooming of injured body parts, a reduction
in grooming behavior under analgesia, and ‘motivational tradeoffs’ such as when hermit
crabs are willing to withstand a mild electric shock in order to obtain a more desirable shell
(Elwood 2011/2012). Shrimps groom their antennae after sustaining an injury — a behavior
reduced when given an analgesic (Barr et al. 2008). Coleoid molluscs show long-term
nociceptive sensitization following moderate injury (Crooke et al. 2011), and a recent study
showed that anaesthetic agents commonly used in research with octopuses and cuttlefish do
not merely immobilize them, but actively suppress both afferent and efferent signals to and
from the CNS, suggesting that these agents suppress not only nociception but also pain
perception (Butler-Struben et al. 2018). On the other hand, some insects engage in normal
feeding and mating behaviors even after sustaining severe injuries, such as dismemberment
(Eisemann et al. 1984; Smith 1991). If confirmed, these findings would suggest either that
these animals do not experience pain (Broom 2013), that they do not experience pain in the
way that vertebrates do,4 or that the circumstances generating pain in these lineages differ
from those in vertebrates.
There is also no reason to think that pain is more likely to have attendant subjective states than other
cognitive and affective states. If we assume that unconscious affective states are possible, as some
representationalist theories of mind allow (Carruthers 2019), pain ‘zombies’ may be just as conceivable as
cognitively complex zombies. Although some would contend that pain is necessarily painful, research on a
condition known as pain asymbolia calls this into question. Subjects with this condition report experiencing
pain as pain but not as unpleasant or aversive, which suggests that the perception of pain and the experience
of its aversiveness can come apart. There is some controversy over whether individuals with pain asymbolia
actually experience pain as affectively neutral or whether they are simply indifferent to and unmotivated by
4
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Even if cognitively sophisticated invertebrates do not experience pain in the same way
that mammals and other vertebrates do, this would not imply they have no morally
protectable interests. A being may have a rich phenomenal and affective inner life, and hence
a welfare of its own, even if it lacks vertebrate-like experiences in response to tissue damage.
It is important to distinguish pain perception narrowly understood from a broader notion of
suffering that includes stress, frustration, and other aversive states that flow from the
inability to fulfill one’s desires. The presence or absence of vertebrate-like pain response is
relevant to the question of what sorts of treatments are ethically permissible, but it should
not be the focal point in our conception of moral standing. Nor are our moral obligations
limited to providing environments that are free of pain broadly construed; they also require
that we provide positive conditions in which sentient animals can flourish — environments
in which they can experience greater amounts of pleasure and develop their natural range of
abilities (Nussbaum 2009).
There are sound theoretical reasons to think that arthropods and some other
invertebrates are capable of experiencing pleasurable and aversive states. The leading
evolutionary explanation of pain is that pain facilitates instrumental learning, helping
animals to avoid future exposure to dangerous or noxious agents. If pain is an adaptive
mechanism through which animals learn which situations to avoid — and pleasure the same
in reverse — then an animal that is capable of instrumental learning may also be capable of
experiencing aversive and pleasurable states (Godfrey-Smith 2017). The presence of openended associative learning in a lineage — including the ability to attach valences to nonstereotypical action sequences — is thus potentially a useful indicator of sentience (Ginsburg
& Jablonka 2019). As we have seen, there is evidence that some invertebrates, such as some
molluscs and insects, are capable of instrumental learning. This is supported by the large
body of research on invertebrate cognition discussed above, as well as experimental evidence
of learning via negative reinforcement (Tedjakumala & Giurfa 2013; for a survey of
associative learning in invertebrates, see Hawkins & Byrne 2015).
At the same time, however, there are reasons to be skeptical about arthropod pain. In
their highly cited review of the animal pain literature, Sneddon et al. (2014) argue that the
success of robotic models in simulating some aspects of pain behavior undercuts the case for
pain in arthropods (see also Adamo 2016). Their reasoning is that pain behavior can be
reproduced by systems that are clearly incapable of experiencing pain, and thus ‘insects, and
possibly other animals, could use simple processing rules to produce pain-like behaviour,
without any internal experience of pain’ (Sneddon et al. 2014). They go even further to
suggest that there is currently no definitive evidence that insects have the cognitive and
emotional capacities that could support aversive mental states.
But why single out insects in this regard? Indeed, one of the robotic models they cite
is a robotic ‘rodent’ designed to reproduce vertebrate-like pain behavior. If robotic models
drive a wedge between behavioural evidence and ascriptions of pain perception, they ought
to do so for all animals — vertebrates included. Moreover, the requirement that evidence of
pain perception be ‘definitive’ is at odds with prevailing evidentiary standards for any
proposition in the field of comparative cognition, let alone for policies that are intended to
the experience of pain (Klein 2015). In any case, as with unconscious cognition, the fact that pain states in a
subset of humans with a dysfunctional condition are not experienced as painful does not establish that some
sentient creatures are in fact pain-zombies.

11

Animal Sentience 2020.329: Mikhalevich & Powell on Invertebrate Minds

manage moral risk (see §4). Zombie hypotheses cannot be definitively ruled out; but this is
as true for vertebrates, including other humans, as it is for invertebrates.
3.
Cognitive-Affective Biases
Lingering progressivist readings of evolution (see Chapman & Huffman 2018) and dismissive
views about the mental capacities of invertebrates are probably not the whole story behind
the treatment of invertebrates. Historically, the pernicious moral exclusion of human groups
has resulted from cognitive-affective biases that shape empirical beliefs and judgments about
moral standing (Buchanan & Powell 2018; Powell et al. 2020). We are in no way equating the
moral exclusion of invertebrates with the mistreatment of human beings; our point is simply
that the treatment of invertebrates in policy, philosophy, and common morality may offer
another illustration of moral exclusion driven by these distorting influences.
3.1 The empathy gap. Empathy is well known to modulate moral judgment: people tend to
morally favor those they empathize with over those with whom they do not. And people tend
to empathize with individuals who look more like them, who are judged to be more
aesthetically attractive, who are potential reciprocating partners, and who are classified as
members of one’s in-group. They tend to have less empathy for — and hence to pass more
severe moral judgment upon or assign lower moral weight to — individuals who are less
similar, less subjectively attractive, or belong to an out-group such as a disfavored race,
ethnicity, or nationality (Prinz 2011; Hewstone 1990). Empathy also mediates attributions of
mental states: empathy deficits are associated with dementalization (the wholesale denial of
mind), decreased mentalization, and reduced sympathy for the victims of violence (for a
review, see Kozak et al. 2006). At the same time, the ‘cuteness response’ (Sherman & Haidt
2011) — an emotional state directed at beings deemed to be cute — is associated with
enhanced empathy and mental-state attribution and it increases prosocial engagement in
ways that lead to moral inclusion.
The ‘alien-ness’ of invertebrate morphologies and lifeways makes the empathy gap
difficult to bridge. The vast majority of invertebrates with complex brains, such as coleoid
molluscs and many arthropods, are rarely considered attractive, cute, or cuddly, and their
body plans, some of their behaviors, communications, forms of sociality, and life histories are
very unfamiliar to humans. As a result, they do not tend to elicit empathy or to be accorded
mental states; this in turn makes it more likely that their interests will be discounted in moral
decision-making. There is also evidence that a timescale bias influences mind attribution:
animals and robots that move at human-typical speeds are more likely to be attributed
mental states than those that move at speeds unfamiliar to humans (Morewedge 2007) such
as those typical for arthropods (fast) and molluscs (slow).
3.2 The disgust response. Perhaps more important than the lack of empathy-eliciting
features in invertebrates is the outright disgust many of these animals trigger in a large
fraction of the human population. The disgust reaction and associated ‘gape face’ is thought
to have originally evolved as a mechanism for avoiding pathogens (Kelly 2011); however,
disgust appears to have been co-opted to mediate social interactions and regulate moral
judgment (Fischer 2016; Kumar 2017; May 2018). In modern humans, disgust plays an
important role in driving morally exclusionary norms, attitudes, and behaviors. Using disgust
to trigger dehumanization is a well-known tactic of would-be genocides and ethnic cleansers.
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Nativist and racist propagandists draw explicitly on the disgust response toward nonhuman
animals in portraying immigrants and other out-group races and ethnicities as diseasebearing vermin; insects like cockroaches, rats, or lice; or free-riding social parasites ‘leeching’
off the hard work of the ‘pure’ races (for reviews, see Haslam 2006; Navarrete & Fessler
2006). Whereas the cuteness response promotes increased social engagement with
subjectively cute beings, disgust leads to avoidance and disengagement from disgust-eliciting
beings (Sherman & Haidt 2011). Disgust can cause people to fail to attribute (or to underattribute) not only intentional cognitive states but also experiential qualities such as pain
perception (Waytz et al. 2010), leading to ‘moral disengagement’ (Bandura 2002).
If invertebrates — especially arthropods like insects and spiders — score very low on
the empathy scale, they receive high marks on the scale of subjective disgust. Priming for
disgust increases the moral derogation of human agents (Schnall et al. 2008; Eskine et al.
2011), and we might expect it to operate similarly, if not more acutely, when directed at
beings who are the immediate objects of the disgust response. Many arthropods map
generically onto ecological categories that are associated either with parasite threat or
physical dangers such as stings and bites, even though few of them actually pose a threat to
humans. A number of arthropod parasites prey directly on humans, and larval forms of
certain insects are associated with rotting flesh, dung, and other disgust-triggering stimuli.
Although these account for a small fraction of arthropods, they tend to provoke an
overgeneralized aggression-avoidance response that is characteristic of antisocial attitudes
under conditions of perceived parasite threat (Fincher & Thornhill 2012; Navarrete & Fessler
2006). Although negative attitudes toward invertebrates are to some degree culturally
transmitted and ameliorated by exposure and education (Mather 2019b; Shipley et al. 2017),
they are likely to emanate in part from an entrenched adaptive heuristic for managing risk in
the Pleistocene and perhaps earlier in vertebrate-arthropod coevolution. It should not be
surprising, therefore, that disgust-provoking animals like arthropods tend to be excluded
from any institutionalized morality that relies on empathetic response.
3.3 Moral justification. In one of the rare substantive philosophical discussions of arthropod
moral standing, philosopher of mind Peter Carruthers (2007) argues that although some
arthropods are probably capable of having beliefs and desires that give rise to interests, we
have no reason to care about their welfare and hence to afford them ethical protections:
It is a fixed point for me that invertebrates make no direct claims on us, despite possessing minds
in the sense that makes sympathy and moral concern possible. Invertebrates believe things, want
things, and make simple plans, and they are capable of having their plans thwarted and their
desires frustrated. But it isn’t wrong to take no account of their suffering. Indeed, I would regard
the contrary belief as a serious moral perversion. (p. 296)

Carruthers maintains, in effect, that invertebrates pose a ‘slippery slope’ problem for animal
ethics: Either we must extend moral consideration to arthropods — which he takes to be
patently absurd — or else we must reject welfarist accounts of animal moral standing in favor
of some alternative account, such as a contractualist view which would limit moral standing
to rational agents who can make and respond to moral claims.
If Carruthers’s argument were sound, it would remove nearly all nonhuman animals,
vertebrates included, from moral consideration. It would not, therefore, single out
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invertebrates for special exclusion, despite their being the central focus of his article. As we
see it, the rhetorical role that invertebrate welfare plays in Carruthers’s argument is to show
that the welfarist approach to moral standing leads to an absurd conclusion: namely, that we
ought to care about the wellbeing of some invertebrates. However, this begs the very question
at issue by simply asserting that extending moral consideration to some invertebrates is
patently absurd — an intuition that Carruthers takes as ‘a fixed point,’ rather than one that is
subject to critical revision in light of new empirical evidence or philosophical argument. Why
should we reject a coherent, well-worked out, and highly corroborated theory of moral
standing, rather than scrutinize a moral intuition that supposedly conflicts with it? Indeed,
we should be suspicious of moral intuitions when there is reason to think they have been
distorted by cognitive-affective biases (Clarke & Roache 2009), which, as we’ve seen, are
especially pronounced in the arthropod context.
Although Carruthers does not subscribe to a rank speciesism or ‘phyla-ism,’ his view
is fundamentally at odds with prevailing ‘subject-centered’ accounts of where moral
obligations come from (Buchanan & Powell 2018). On these views, intrinsic moral worth is
grounded not in an individual’s contingent ability to care about or cooperate with beings of a
particular sort, but rather in that individual’s possession of certain morally relevant
psychological properties. And there is wide agreement, not only among Utilitarians but also
among contemporary Kantians (e.g., Korsgaard 2018), that it is sentience — not the capacity
for reason — that sets the minimum bar for being a member of the moral community.
Carruthers also worries that the moral inclusion of invertebrates would require
humans to sweep the floor before them like Jainist Monks, so as to avoid stepping on
scurrying ants and beetles, to say nothing of changes to the global agricultural industry which
relies heavily on pest management — a ridiculous requirement, he believes, for any secular
morality. The concern that ‘moral standing creep’ could result in overly demanding
restrictions on valuable human activities has also figured in the literature on fish welfare (e.g.,
Key 2016). There are several problems with this ‘overdemandingness’ objection as it relates
to invertebrate inclusion. First, the fact that living up to our moral obligations is hard is a
patently inadequate reason for failing to meet those obligations.
Second, the over-demanding line wrongly assumes that moral standing confers
equally robust protections on all who have it. The fact that an individual meets the minimum
threshold for moral standing does not entitle that individual to equal treatment (Singer 1974;
DeGrazia 2008) or confer on them equal moral status (Buchanan 2009). Beings with different
moral statuses may have different sets of rights, and some moral statuses may be accorded
no ‘rights’ at all (conceived in terms of their inviolability) even if they entail interests that
constrain the behavior of moral agents. Similarly, on a continuum of interests view, some
types of interest (such as future-directed ones) may outweigh others when they come into
conflict, which is frequently how experimentation on sentient beings who lack futuredirected interests is justified (within the bounds of unnecessary suffering). Thus, even if some
invertebrates have interests that are in conflict with our own, resolving these conflicts should
take the same form as conflict-resolutions between humans and non-rational vertebrates in
moral triage scenarios. Whether harm to a small number of vertebrate subjects is morally
preferable to harm to a large number of invertebrate subjects is unclear. But such questions
should be resolved through an analysis of interest conflicts, not by according some legitimate
interests no weight at all.
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Third, some apparent interest conflicts may disappear once we realize that what
counts as a harm to human persons may not be a harm to many sentient animals. For example,
while a painless death is a harm to persons because (e.g.) it frustrates their interest in a
valuable future, death may not be a harm to animals who have no such future-directed
interests (McMahan 2002). Thus, including some invertebrates in the moral community may
not require that we shoulder unpalatable moral burdens, such as drastically altering our
lifeways or the modes and fruits of scientific enterprise (but see Sebo 2018).
4.
Managing Uncertainty in Science and Ethics
Thus far, we have argued that the evidence does not justify the asymmetrical treatment
accorded to vertebrates and invertebrates, and we have suggested that a number of
questionable empirical assumptions combined with cognitive-affective biases created this
inconsistent state of affairs. We do not mean to give the impression that there are no
significant uncertainties concerning the mental capacities of invertebrates. In this section, we
will consider these scientific uncertainties and how they should interact with ethical science
policy.
4.1 Error avoidance in comparative cognition. One general problem facing comparative
cognitive science is that competing explanations often cannot be adjudicated through
behavioral evidence alone. The field has typically responded to this ‘underdetermination’
challenge by adopting a policy of erring on the side of avoiding false positives: ascribing
sophisticated mental states to animals who do not in fact have them. This methodological
strategy is based on the assumption that, all else being equal, one should prefer the simplest
hypothesis consistent with the evidence, where ‘simplest’ is typically taken to mean ‘least
cognitively sophisticated’ (Shettleworth 2010; Heyes 2012). Simpler explanations can almost
always be given, though, and where one fails, another will often rise to take its place. The
preference for simplicity may be especially strong in the invertebrate context, where it is
likely to interact with aspects of the invertebrate dogma, such as the belief that small brains
are unlikely to generate sophisticated cognition. For example, some are likely to interpret the
fact that bees replicate findings of cognitive research on mammals and birds not as evidence
for the presence of sophisticated cognition in invertebrates, but as a reason to think that the
underlying experiments are flawed or that the cognitive capacities being tested are simpler
than typically thought — either in bees or generally in nonhuman animals. This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that, as noted earlier, simple neural networks and robots can recreate
aspects of invertebrate behavior.
There is now a substantial literature arguing that the preference for simplicity is
conceptually problematic, empirically unsubstantiated, and likely to lead comparative
cognitive science away from rather than toward the truth (Mikhalevich et al. 2017;
Mikhalevich 2015; see also Sober 1998; Fitzpatrick 2016; Dacey 2016). Because this problem
applies to all of comparative cognition, we will not delve into it here. However, it is worth
noting that some of the inferential strategies that might help resolve the underdetermination
problem are inaccessible in the invertebrate research context. For example, one way of
adjudicating competing cognitive hypotheses when they are underdetermined by behavioral
observation is to bring other sources of evidence to bear on the adjudication, such as
comparative brain data. If the same brain structures known to support complex cognition in
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some animals are present in others due to their inheritance from a common ancestor, then
this will add weight to the inference of sentience.
These homology-based strategies are generally not available in the invertebrate
context, however. The centralized nervous systems of invertebrates exhibit little clear
structural homology with vertebrates, since their brains evolved largely (or entirely)
independently from vertebrates and from one another (for a discussion of the most likely
nervous system structure of the last common bilaterian ancestor, see Ginsburg & Jablonka
2019; Powell 2020; Northcutt 2012; Erwin & Valentine 2011). Homologies at lower levels,
such as cell-type and signaling molecules (deFur 2004), do not have any straightforward
implications for sentience or cognitive sophistication. Therefore, if comparative brain data
can be used to break the evidential impasse in the case of invertebrates, it will have to be
mainly evidence of the functional, not historical, kind (Mikhalevich et al. 2017).
As we saw earlier, convergent brain macrostructures dedicated to central processing
and integration appear to exist in some invertebrates and are corroborated by behavior
elicited in experiments. Could the preferential treatment of vertebrates over invertebrates
nevertheless be justified by the greater confidence that brain homology (similarity due to
common descent) permits in ascribing sentience? There are several reasons to doubt this.
First, without a well-worked out theory of sentience that tells us what sorts of functional
configurations we should be looking for, we have no way of knowing what level of homology
to target. If we take healthy adult humans as the prototypical case of sentience: we cannot
know how phylogenetically deep the inference of homology should go (e.g., to all primates,
mammals, tetrapods, vertebrates, etc.) unless we have already identified the structures in
humans that give rise to sentience. Once we have done so, we can determine the distribution
of those same characteristics in vertebrates more broadly. The trouble is that homologies
must be delineated in part by their similarities in function, whether these are cashed out in
terms of the causal (Amundson & Lauder 1994) or evolutionarily selected (Rosenberg &
Neander 2009) roles they perform. In other words, homology hypotheses are used to explain
and classify characters that have already been individuated using various functional metrics;
if this is so, then homology hypotheses are not function-free and hence have no distinct
advantages over functional analyses of convergent brains.
4.2 Error-avoidance in ethics and science policy. One effect of the simplicity preference in
comparative cognition is that it results in a bias toward false negatives, or failing to attribute
sentience and sophisticated cognition when in fact they are present. Whether or not the
preference for false negatives is justified in this domain of research, in bioethical policy there
are reasons to take the opposite approach: that is, to err on the side of avoiding false
negatives, or scenarios in which we fail to identify a morally relevant cognitive property in
nonhuman animals or margin-zone humans when they actually possess them. If the costs of
falsely attributing sentience to animals are minor while the costs of false negatives are high
(because, for instance, they result in a great deal of unnecessary suffering), then erring on the
side of false positives is prima facie ethically preferable. How should we manage the moral
risk that flows from scientific uncertainty about invertebrate welfares?
Ethicists and policy-makers often appeal to the ‘precautionary principle’ (PP), which
on standard accounts holds that we need not await scientific certainty before taking
precautionary measures to avoid harm to health or the environment (Sneddon et al. 2014).
While this may sound like a reasonable approach, there is significant disagreement over how
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the PP should be formulated, whether it is conceptually coherent, whether it is addressed to
a regulatory straw man, and whether it provides concrete, rational guidance on matters of
practical moral concern (Sunstein 2003; Powell 2010; Steele 2013). Birch (2017) proposes a
version of PP that is specifically tailored to the animal welfare context, which he calls the
Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP). According to the ASPP, ‘where there are
threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the
sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent those outcomes’ (Birch 2017, p. 3).
Birch’s account has two major virtues. The first is that it attempts to specify the
relevant evidential threshold below scientific certainty at which precautionary measures
should kick in. For Birch, the evidential bar for ethics and policy should be set at statistically
significant and scientifically valid evidence of ‘at least one credible indicator of sentience’ in
at least one species of an order, which may then be generalized to other species of that order.
The second virtue relates to Birch’s proposed decision procedure, which is designed to kick
in once a credible indicator of sentience is found. According to ASPP, rather than leading to
irrational moral paralysis, wherever the epistemic criterion is met, animal subjects must be
included in ethical regulatory regimes, but experimental research on those subjects can
continue so long as minimal welfare requirements are met.
Birch’s analysis is a marked improvement over the traditionally vague language of
precaution, but we believe it could be strengthened on several points. First, Birch cites
pragmatic justifications for generalizing to the entire Linnaean order: it is not feasible to test
all species of an order for sentience, he argues, and thus we may generalize from a single
credible indicator of sentience in a single species to the entire order in which that species
belongs. Although Birch does not state it explicitly, this justification can only be partly
practical — the other part must be theoretical, grounded in a two-fold hypothesis about
homology: first, that the last common ancestor of the ‘order’ (more accurately, the order-level
clade) was sentient, and second, that the conservation of sentience is more likely than its loss
in a given order. Both these assumptions need to be defended. The trouble is that the ‘polarity’
of a character (i.e., whether it is ancestral or derived) cannot be ascertained without
examining how that character is distributed in a clade, which is precisely the problem at issue
here and which Birch claims cannot feasibly be assessed. This point can be illustrated by
applying the ASPP to language: The ASPP would have us infer from the fact that humans have
language that all primates (including not only apes, but also monkeys and lemurs) have this
trait. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that the last common primate ancestor — a shrewlike creature that branched off from other mammalian orders not long after the endCretaceous extinction — did not have so much as the rudiments of language, and thus the
inference based on order-level homology is not justified. Other phylogenetic problems with
the ASPP that stem from its anachronistic Linnaean formulation are discussed by Brown
(2017) and Mallatt (2017).
Second, even if the strategy of inferring homology could be salvaged, the
generalization only kicks in if a morally relevant mental capacity can be reliably attributed to
at least one taxon within a given order. The problem is that some will reject the claim that a
‘credible indicator of sentience’ has been shown in cases where cognitive hypotheses are
underdetermined by the behavioral evidence. It is not immediately obvious how the ASPP
would (or should) handle cases of behavioral underdetermination, though one approach
would be to factor in extra-experimental evidence (such as comparative brain data) and to
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err moderately on the side of over-attribution in light of the biases discussed above and given
the moral costs of getting it wrong. In addition, although Birch is operating with an
appropriately broad notion of sentience that includes positive and aversive states, his
analysis focuses almost entirely on traditional pain perception, which leaves him agnostic on
the question of invertebrate (especially arthropod) moral standing. We have already seen the
limits of pain-centered approaches, such as their failure to extend moral protections to beings
with rich inner worlds that lack traditional markers of pain perception. We have also
suggested that although pain perception may be a sufficient condition for moral standing, a
broader range of cognitive and affective abilities should bear on the determination of
sentience (see §3). The search for a credible indicator of sentience should avail itself of the
full breadth of evidence, including not only behavioral experiments but also ecology,
neuroscience, and evolutionary biology; it should also probe for markers of sentience that go
beyond familiar expressions of pain in response to tissue damage. All told, however, the
precautionary spirit of Birch’s account could remain valid even if his generalization strategy
were abandoned in favor of a broader evidence-based approach.
Finally, there is a normative problem with Birch’s discussion that it shares with much
of the PP literature. Namely, it pays inadequate attention to the moral costs that could flow
from acting out of precaution. Given the high costs of false negatives and the impracticalities
of testing for sentience throughout the animal kingdom, why not simply generalize to all
bilaterian animals, rather than (as Birch recommends) to all taxa within a given order? The
answer, presumably, is that overgeneralization has moral costs. If these costs are likely to be
substantial — for instance, because erring on the side of caution would significantly interfere
with or constrain research designed to benefit humans or other sentient animals — then
aspiring to more targeted judgments about the presence of morally relevant cognitive
properties may be ethically preferable. If so, then we have strong moral incentives to get the
attribution of sentience right; extreme positions that require either very high or very low
levels of certainty ought to be rejected.
5.
Summary and Conclusion
We have argued that the nearly wholesale exclusion of invertebrates with central nervous
systems from bioethics and science policy is not justified by the current state of the evidence.
This exclusion is likely driven in part by outdated evolutionary ideas, stereotypes about the
rigid instinctual behaviors of small-brained animals, cognitive biases that distort moral
attitudes toward these deeply unfamiliar creatures, and flawed strategies for managing
scientific and moral uncertainty. We have not offered any practical recommendations for
changing the treatment of invertebrates. (For concrete policy proposals regarding a range of
invertebrates, including arthropods, see Carere & Mather 2019; Rethink Priorities 2018;
Crooke 2013; Horvath et al. 2013; and Cooper 2011.) Our goal here has not been to determine
whether invertebrates can suffer under specific experimental conditions or live well in
others; rather, we addressed a more foundational question: whether these animals are
capable of suffering or flourishing at all. We have made a case for consistency in moral
treatment: the same kinds of data and reasoning that justify moral protections for vertebrates
favor extending similar protections to some invertebrates. Invertebrate brains comprise
upwards of 99% of the brains that exist on Earth. Cognitive theorists have begun to
appreciate the intellectual rewards of studying invertebrate cognition and sentience. It is
time that ethicists and policy makers do the same.
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